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DUE PROCESS IN SENTENCING: A RIGHT TO
REBUT THE PRESENTENCE REPORT?
By Robert Andrew Harkness*
Introduction
Sentencing of a defendant is the point at which criminal guilt
has been officially determined, either by a trial with all its constitu-
tionally compelled safeguards or by formal admission of guilt,1 and
society decides what to do next with the criminal offender. At this
stage of the criminal process, the sentencing court decides whether to
release the convicted defendant outright on probation, incarcerate him
in a penal institution with or without the possibility of parole, or divert
him to a less restrictive rehabilitative program.' In addition, the sen-
tencing court determines the duration of the dispositional alternative
which best suits the particular needs of the individual defendant. In
making these decisions, the court must consider the characteristics of
the defendant upon Whom sentence is to be imposed. Modem penolog-
ical concepts of individualizing punishment require that the sentencing
judge possess "the fullest information possible concerning the defend-
ant's life and characteristics."'
In the federal courts, the sentencing judge relies heavily upon the
presentence report to supply him with this information. The presen-
tence report is prepared for the court by a probation officer pursuant
to Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 It provides
* J.D., 1975, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. It should be noted that 80 to 90 percent of criminal cases are disposed of
through guilty pleas, so that for the vast majority of criminal defendants the critical
determination is of sentence, not guilt or innocence. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADmIN. OF JusTicE, TAsE FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, 9 (1967);
1966 DIRECTOR OF THE ADM. OFCE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANN. REP. 220. This pattern
has remained virtually unchanged for years; similar figures were reported in Newman,
Pleading Guilty for Consideration: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
780 (1956).
2. See Lehrich, The Use and Disclosure of Presentence Reports in the United
States, 47 F.R.D. 225 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Lehrich].
3. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
4. "(c) PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
(2) Report. The report of the presentence investigation shall contain any prior criminal
[1065]
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the sentencing court with the information necessary for a reasoned
choice between the potential dispositional alternatives.5
Whether a convicted criminal defendant has a right to learn what
information forms the basis for his sentence and whether the defendant
should be given an opportunity to assure the factual accuracy of that
information has been long debated.6 Constitutional issues arise when
a criminal defendant is sentenced on the basis of false or inaccurate
information or when the sentencing judge refuses to disclose to the con-
victed defendant what information constituted the basis for the sen-
tence. Does fundamental fairness under the due process clauses of our
Constitution require disclosure to the defendant of the informational
basis of his sentence?
Former Rule 32 did not come to grips with these issues. 7 Effective
December 1, 1975, proposed Rule 32(c) (3) (A)&(B) will provide:
(3) Disclosure
(A) Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request per-
mit the defendant, or his counsel if he is so represented, to read
the report of the presentence investigation exclusive of any recom-
mendation as to sentence, but not to the extent that in the opinion
of the court the report contains diagnostic opinion which might
seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, sources of information
obtained upon a promise of confidentiality, or any other informa-
tion which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise,
to the defendant or other persons; and the court shall -afford the
defendant or his counsel an opportunity to comment thereon and,
at the discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or other infor-
mation relating to any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in the
presentence report.
record of the defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial
condition and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing
sentence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and
such other information as may be required by the court." FED. R. CRM. P. 32, 18
U.S.C. App., Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts, Rule 32
(1970).
5. The probation service recommends that certain information be included in
every presentence report: the defendant's version of the offense, prior criminal record,
family and mental history, home and leisure time activities, health, employment, military
service, financial condition, evaluative summary and recommended disposition. DivisION
OF PROBATION, ADM. OFFICE OF TiE U.S. CoURTs, PuB. No. 103, THE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT 9 (1965).
6. For an overview of the debate on this issue, see the sources listed in Buchea v.
Sullivan, 497 P.2d 1169, 1171-72 n.7 (Ore. 1972); 2C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 524 nn.49 & 50 (Supp. 1973) [hereinafter cited as 2 WRIGHT];
Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Court: Due Process and Judicial
Discretion, 26 HASTINGS LJ. 1527, 1527 n.1 (1975); see also AMERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION STANDARDs RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROcEDURES § 4.1-.6,
commentary at 201-31 (approved draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. STANDARDS].
7. See notes 30, 37 & 43 infra and text accompanying.
1066 [Vol. 2
(3) If the court is of the view that there is information in the
presentence report which should not be disclosed under sub-
division (c)(3)(A) of this rule, the court in lieu of making the
report or part thereof available shall state orally or in writing a
summary of the factual information contained therein to be relied
on in determining sentence, and shall give the defendant or his
counsel an opportunity to comment thereon. The statement may
be made to the parties in camera.8
If disclosure is mandated under the new Rule 32 must the defend-
ant also be afforded an opportunity to rebut what he feels to be incor-
rect or inaccurate information? Does the defendant have the right
under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution to cross-
examine those who have given information against him? Can he pro-
duce witnesses or introduce evidence in his own behalf at the sentenc-
ing proceeding? What protections does our Constitution extend to a
criminal defendant after the issue of his guilt or innocence has been
resolved?
Policy Considerations
The policy considerations for and against disclosure of the infor-
mational basis for a sentence are well-known and have been repeatedly
asserted.9 The clear trend among commentators and institutions consid-
ering this issue is in favor of disclosure.10 The considerations motivat-
ing nondisclosure, such as fear that informational sources will dry up
through embarrassment or revenge, sentencing proceedings will be-
come unduly protracted, or rehabilitative efforts will be hampered by
disclosure of the diagnostic portions of the presentence report, were
8. PuB. L. No. 94-64, § 3, 89 Stat. 370 (1975), amending Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts, 62
F.R.D. 271, 320-21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Amendments].
9. See 2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, RuLEs OF CRMINAL PRocEDURE 8A,
32.03(4) (Supp. 1974); A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 216-24; Gray, Post Trial
Discovery: Disclosure of the Presentence Investigation Report, 4 TOL. L. RPv. 1, 2-4
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Gray]; Lehrich, supra note 2, at 238-46. See also United
States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178, 1186-1201 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
10. See, e.g., PRESIDENTS ComM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF
JUSTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocEETY 145 (1967); A.B.A. STANDARDs,
supra note 6; NAT'L CouNciL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT, §
4 (1963) & (1972) [hereinafter cited as MODEL SENTENCING ACT]; AMERICAN LAW
INsTrrUtr MODEL PENAL CODE, § 7.07(5) (preliminary draft 1962); Gray, supra note 9;
Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports: A Constitutional Right to Rebut Adverse
Information by Cross-Examination, 3 RUrGms-CAm. LJ. 111 (1971); Note, The Pre-
sentence Report: An Empirical Study of its Use in the Federal Criminal Process, 58 GEO.
LJ. 451 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Empirical Study]; Note, Procedural Due Process at
Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L REV. 821 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Judicial Sentencing].
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found unsupported by actual practice and insufficient, when weighed
against the interests of both the defendant and society in having sen-
tences based upon accurate information. Fairness to the defendant re-
quires that he be informed of the facts upon which his sentence is based
so that he may have a fair opportunity to ensure their accuracy. 1
Confidentiality
One of the weightiest arguments against the disclosure of the
presentence report to the convicted defendant is that such disclosure
would violate the confidential relationship between the probation offi-
cer and his informants and make it more difficult to obtain needed in-
formation. Underlying this argument is the fear that a vengeful defend-
ant will retaliate against the informant, and that without promise of
confidentiality to the informant, this source of potentially useful infor-
mation will "dry up."
Empirical evidence suggests that disclosure does not inevitably
destroy confidentiality or result in serious loss of information to the sen-
tencing court."2 In a particular case, special circumstances might indi-
cate a potential danger to an informant, but special protective proce-
dures could permit disclosure without revealing the identity of the con-
fidential informant.'" If the information from a confidential informant
is indeed crucial to the determination of sentence, its accuracy should
be ensured by the traditional means of resolving issues of fact.
In discussing the importance of resolving factual issues, Chief Jus-
tice Warren has pointed out that:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in ourjurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action
depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Govern-
ment's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an
opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in
the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where
the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose mem-
ory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons
motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, orjealousy. We have formalized these protections in the require-
ments of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient
roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment which pro-
vides that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right "to
be confronted with the witnesses against him." This Court has
11. See A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 219-20; Gray, supra note 9, at 5;
Lehrich, supra note 2, at 238-46; Empirical Study, supra note 10, at 472.
12. See A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 219-20; Lehrich, supra note 2, at 239;
Empirical Study, supra note 10, at 474; Judicial Sentencing, supra note 10, at 838-41.
13. See A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 217-18; Empirical Study, supra note 10,
at 472; Judicial Sentencing, supra note 10, at 839.
1068 HASTNGS CONSTITUTINAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 2
been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken
out not only in criminal cases . ..but also in all types of cases
where administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny.14
Surely it is only fair to apply these same procedures at sentencing to
the resolution of factual issues. Sentencing involves the same potential
problems in determining facts to be used as a basis for the selection
of dispositional alternatives. Where these facts are in issue, it is vitally
important to ensure their accuracy by utilizing the traditional methods
for resolving issues of fact.
Delay
In Williams v. New York,' 5 the United States Supreme Court first
warned against the danger of protracted sentencing proceedings, argu-
ing that the type and extent of sentencing "information make totally
impractical if not impossible open court testimony with cross-examina-
tion. Such a procedure could endlessly delay criminal administration
in a retrial of collateral issues."' The Court feared that the sentenc-
ing proceeding would be turned into a second trial, adding further
strain to already limited judicial resources. However, since approxi-
mately eighty-five percent of all defendants in the federal criminal sys-
tem plead guilty,' 7 the sentencing proceeding provides the court with
the only opportunity to learn the circumstances of the crime and the
character of the defendant. Thus for the vast majority of criminal
defendants the critical determination of factual issues takes place at
sentencing and not at trial.
Defense counsel will rarely indulge in frivolous and time-consum-
ing arguments at a sentencing proceeding. Since much of the informa-
tion contained in the presentence report is readily verifiable, the
defendant will be reluctant to antagonize the sentencing judge with
nonmeritorious claims in his behalf, when the sentencing judge has vir-
tually unreviewable discretion as to the type and length of sentence.
In addition, any attempt by the defense attorney to engage in dilatory
tactics by arguing irrelevant issues is subject to the court's traditional
discretion to control its own proceedings by limiting argument on
collateral issues.' Experience in jurisdictions allowing disclosure of
the presentence report to the defendant indicates no untoward delay
in sentencing proceedings.' Disclosure should in fact narrow the
14. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
15. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
16. Id. at 250.
17. See note 1 supra.
18. See Lehrich, supra note 2, at 239-40; Empirical Study, supra note 10, at 472-73;
ludicial Sentencing, supra note 10, at 841.
19. See Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Amendments, supra note 8, at 325;
Lehrich, supra note 2, at 239-40.
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scope of inquiry at the sentencing proceeding by sharply delineating
the real issues of fact at stake, thereby eliminating the need to discuss
extraneous matters.
Rehabilitation
Opponents of disclosure also argue that the disclosure of the pre-
sentence report to the defendant win interfere with rehabilitation
efforts. They contend revelation of the probation officer's candid diag-
nostic opinion of the defendant and his recommQndation as to disposi-
tion might upset or destroy the close personal relationship between the
probation officer and the defendant which is necessary to gain the
cooperation of the defendant in a successful program of rehabilitation.
However, the delicacy of this relationship is due to the probation of-
ficer's dual role as social worker and officer of the court during sentenc-
ing, and not to his role as counselor. Practically, case load burdens
may limit the development of any intimate relationship between the
probation officer and the defendant. If. the relationship is substantially
impaired by disclosure of the presentence report, a different probation
officer may be assigned for the actual implementation of a rehabilitative
program. In any case, the defendant always has a strong incentive to
cooperate with the probation officer, since the probation officer has the
power to recommend to the court a more restrictive disposition for the
defendant. Probation officers usually recommend a disposition more
lenient than that actually imposed by the court, so there is little likeli-
hood that the relationship between probation officer and defendant will
be disturbed in the great majority of cases. Any disadvantages of dis-
closure are outweighed by the value of having accurate factual informa-
tion at the disposal of the sentencing judge when he is determining
which dispositional alternative best fits the needs of both the defendant
and society.20
Benefits of Disclosure
The chief benefit of disclosing the factual content of the presen-
tence report to the defendant is that it will assure the accuracy of the
information contained in the report. No matter how well motivated the
probation officer is, he does not have the time or resources available
to investigate comprehensively each defendant's case.2 ' Under such
circumstances, the probation officer cannot assure the accuracy of all
the information in his report; often he must resort to second- and third-
20. See Empirical Study, supra note 10, at 473; Judicial Sentencing, supra note 10,
at 840-41.
21. See Lehrich, supra note 2, at 241; Judicial Sentencing, supra note 10, at 837
n.82.
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hand hearsay in order to get any information at all. By allowing the
inspection of the presentence report, the defendant is able to call to the
attention of the court any factual inaccuracies in the report. This will
avoid the tragic consequence of a defendant serving an undeservedly
severe sentence because of false information in a report which he neither
saw nor had any opportunity to challenge.
A less compelling consideration, but nonetheless important, is that
disclosure will also allow the defendant to participate in the judicial
process of sentencing and enable him to understand the reasons for the
court's disposition of his case. The defendant will be able to perceive
that the sentencing decision is not arbitrary, but a reasoned judgment
based on all the facts of the case: This will increase the fairness of
the system because it will increase the appearance of fairness, and this
could be a significant factor influencing the rehabilitation of the
defendant.22
Constitutional Considerations
In addition to the policy considerations discussed above, important
constitutional considerations militate for disclosure. The due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments extend to convicted
defendants the right not to be sentenced on the basis of materially false
information as a requirement of fundamental fairness. In Townsend
v. Burke,2" the defendant pleaded guilty in state court to robbery and
burglary charges. At sentencing the defendant was not represented by
counsel. Before pronouncing sentence, the court recited to the de-
fendant his prior criminal record, including two charges of which the
defendant had been found not guilty. Speaking for the majority of the
Supreme Court, Justice Jackson stated:
It is not the duration or severity of this sentence that renders it
constitutionally invalid; it is the careless or designed pronounce-
ment of sentence on a foundation so extensively and materially
false, which the prisoner had no opportunity to correct by the ser-
vices which counsel would provide, that renders the proceedings
lacking in due process. 24
This approach was reaffirmed by the Court in United States v.
Tucker.25 The defendant has been convicted of armed bank robbery
22. See A.B.A. STANxxns, supra note 6, at 224; Empirical Study, supra note 10, at
474.
23. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
24. Id. at 741.
25. 404 U.S. 443 (1972). For purposes of sentencing the Supreme Court finds no
difference between the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In
Tucker, the Court applied the Townsend due process rule directly to the case at bar. Id.
at 447.
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after a jury trial in federal district court. At sentencing the court con-
ducted an inquiry into the defendant's background and gave explicit
attention to the three previous felony convictions which the defendant
had acknowledged. Several years later it was conclusively determined
in collateral proceedings that two of these convictions considered by the
court were constitutionally invalid because the* defendant had not been
represented by counsel. The Court found that the sentence for armed
robbery was founded, at least in part, upon those invalid convictions and
that a sentence based upon such materially false information could not
stand. The Court affirmed the appellate court's remand to the trial
court for resentencing without consideration of any constitutionally
invalid convictions.
A close reading of Townsend strongly suggests that it may well
be the duty of defense counsel to assure that the sentence is based on
accurate information. In Townsend, Justice Jackson noted:
We believe that on the record before us, it is evident that this
uncounseled defendant was either overreached by the prosecution's
submission of misinformation to the court or was prejudiced by the
court's own misreading of the record. Counsel, had any been
present, would have been under a duty to prevent the court from
proceeding on such false assumptions and perhaps under a duty to
seek remedy elsewhere if they persisted.26
In Kent v. inited States,27 the court elaborated upon the duties of de-
fense counsel in the context of a juvenile waiver hearing. In requiring
disclosure of a juvenile's social records to his attorney before the waiver
hearing, Justice Fortas made these observations about the defense
attorney's role in ensuring the accuracy of information upon which the
judge's decision is based:
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' statement,
attempting to justify denial of access to these records, that counsel's
role is limited to presenting "to the court anything on behalf of the
child which might help the court in arriving at a decision; it is not
to denigrate the staff's submissions and recommendations." On the
contrary, if the staff's submissions include materials which are sus-
ceptible to challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role of
counsel to "denigrate" such matter.28
How can the defendant's right to be sentenced on accurate information
be assured if the defense has no knowledge of precisely what informa-
tion is being considered or relied upon by the sentencing judge? In
order to assure adequate representation by counsel and the accuracy
of sentencing information, fundamental fairness to the accused man-
dates that the defense be fully informed of the facts upon which the
sentence is based.
26. 334 U.S. at 740.
27. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
28. Id. at 563.
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Early Approach in the Federal Courts
The initial approach of the federal courts to these problems was
decisively determined by the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v.
New York29 and the express language of Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 32.30 In Williams, the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder by a jury in state court. The jury recommended a sentence
of life imprisonment, but the judge, relying upon information that the
defendant had engaged in a great number of serious crimes, as yet un-
charged, imposed the sentence of death. This information had been
furnished to the trial court during the course of the presentence investi-
gation without affording the defendant any opportunity to confront or
cross-examine witnesses supplying the information. Upon appeal the de-
fendant argued that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment because "the sentence of death was based upon
information supplied by witnesses with whom the accused had not been
confronted and as to whom he had no opportunity for cross-examina-
tion or rebuttal."-'' The Supreme Court, after pointing out that judges
at common law and under the New York statutes32 traditionally exer-
cised wide discretion in utilizing sources and types of sentencing infor-
mation, and expressing the fear that "most of the information now relied
upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences
would be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open
court by witnesses subject to cross-examination,"38 refused to find a
violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
Until the adoption of Rule 32, there had been no uniform formal-
ized procedure enabling the federal district courts to utilize the proba-
tion service which had been created in 1925 for the purpose of
preparing presentence reports to aid the courts in sentencing. As a
result, court practices varied widely and not all the courts were provided
with relevant personal and background information necessary to a
reasoned determination of sentence. Rule 32 met this problem by re-
quiring a presentence report on every defendant unless the sentencing
29. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). This approach was reaffirmed in Williams v. Oklahoma,
358 U.S. 576 (1959).
30. FED. R. CRuM. P. 32, 18 U.S.C. App., Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
United States District Courts, Rule 32 (1952).
31. 337 U.S. at 243.
32. Id. at 245-46.
33. Id. at 250.
34. Id. at 250-52. Despite the broad language used by the Supreme Court in
Williams v. New York, the trial judge did disclose to the defendant the information upon
which the sentence was based and the accuracy of the information was not challenged by
the defendant or his attorney. Id. at 244. Thus Williams v. New York may be seen
essentially as a case of waiver.
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court directed otherwise. s5 When first adopted by the Supreme Court
in 1946,36 Rule 32 was silent as to disclosure of the presentence re-
port to the defendant.3 7  Relying upon Williams and the failure of
Rule 32 to expressly provide for dislosure, the federal courts refused
the convicted defendant any right to inspect the presentence report or
to rebut or contradict any information contained in it.
In Hoover v. United States.38 the defendant pleaded guilty in fed-
eral district court to two counts of transporting stolen automobiles. The
defendant was then sentenced to imprisonment for a period of five
years on the first count and to three years on the second, the sentences
to run consecutively. The defendant challenged the imposition of these
sentences on the grounds that the presentence report contained many
inaccurate, untrue, and prejudicial statements, and the failure of the
court to allow him to rebut these statements amounted to a denial of
due process. Citing the language of Rule 32 and Williams, the ap-
pellate court upheld the sentencing judge without mentioning any con-
stitutional issues which might arise under Townsend.3 9  In United
States v. Durham,40 the defendant moved for an opportunity to inspect
the probation officer's report of the presentence investigation before
sentencing. Relying upon Williams and expressing the fear that if
these reports were made available to counsel as a matter of right, infor-
mation generally contained in them would become unavailable, the dis-
trict court denied the defendant's motion. The defendant appealed
the decision to the Supreme Court, but the Court refused to review it.
In 1966 the Supreme Court, over the strong dissent of Justice
Douglas,41 amended Rule 32, explicitly sanctioning discretionary dis-
35. Empirical Study, supra note 10, at 454-55 and sources cited therein.
36. The Supreme Court is authorized to promulgate general rules of criminal
procedure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72. These rules cover pretrial and post-trial
matters and procedures, as well as the criminal trial itself. The Supreme Court must
report the rules to Congress after the beginning of a regular session but not later than
May 1. The changes become effective ninety days after being reported and nullify all
laws in conflict with them unless Congress provides otherwise.
37. For a detailed history of Rule 32(c) and the strong judicial opposition to
mandatory disclosure, see 2 WRImrT, supra note 6, § 524.
38. 268 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1959). In Powers v. United State,% 325 F.2d 666 (1st
Cir. 1963), the court took the same approach to the disclosure of a Bureau of Prisons
presentence report prepared pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208.
39. Hoover v. United States, 268 F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 1959).
40. 181 F. Supp. 503, 504 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 854 (1960).
41. "The proposed amendment to Rule 32(c)(2) states that the trial judge 'may'
disclose to the defendant or his counsel the contents of a presentence report on which he
is relying in fixing sentence. The imposition of sentence is of critical importance to a
man convicted of crime. Trial judges need presentence reports so that they may have at
their disposal the fullest possible information. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241.
But while the formal rules of evidence do not apply to restrict the factors which the
1074 [Vol. 2
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closure.42 Rule 32 then provided:
The court before imposing sentence may disclose to the defendant
or his counsel all or part of the material contained in the report
of the presentence investigation and afford an opportunity to the
defendant or his counsel to comment thereon.43
Continuing to rely upon the broad discretion seemingly approved by
the Supreme Court in Williams and embracing this express language
of Rule 32 in its amended form,44 the federal courts held without dis-
cussing the applicability to Townsend, that disclosure of the presen-
tence report to the defendant was within the discretion of the trial court
and that the defendant had no right to inspect it or rebut any adverse
information it contained.45
The only concession to Townsend4 6 was made in Baker v. United
sentencing judge may consider, fairness would, in my opinion, require that the defendant
be advised of the facts-perhaps very damaging to him-on which the judge intends to
rely. The presentence report may be inaccurate, a flaw which may be of constitutional
dimension. Cf. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736. It may exaggerate the gravity of the
defendant's prior offenses. The investigator may have made an incomplete investigation.
See Tappan, Crime, Justice, and Correction 556 (1960). There may be countervailing
factors not disclosed by the probation report. In many areas we can rely on the sound
exercise of discretion by the trial judge; but how can a judge know whether or not the
presentence report calls for a reply by the defendant? Its faults may not appear on the
face of the document.
"Some States require full disclosure of the report to the defense. The proposed Model
Penal Code takes the middle ground and requires the sentencing judge to disclose to the
defense the factual contents of the report so that there is an opportunity to reply.
Whatever should be the rule for the federal courts, it ought not to be one which permits
a judge to impose sentence on the basis of information of which the defendant may be
unaware and to which he has not been afforded an opportunity to reply." 383 U.S. 1089,
1092-93, 39 F.R.D. 276, 278-79 (1966) (Justice Douglas' dissent to amended Fmn. R.
CRm. P. 32) (footnotes omitted).
42. See Banister v. United States, 379 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 927 (1968).
43. FEn. R. CRM. P. 32, 18 U.S.C. App., Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
United States District Courts, Rule 32 (1970) (emphasis added).
44. See note 36 supra.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205, 1214 (8th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1013 (1970); Thompson v. United States, 381 F.2d 664, 666-67 (10th
Cir. 1967); Roeth v. United States, 380 F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1015 (1968).
46. Though not completely ignored, the basis for review under Townsend remained
unclear. For example, in United States v. Weiner, 376 F.2d 42, 43 (1967), the appellate
court found that there were no erroneous assumptions of fact or careless or designed
pronouncement of sentence on a false foundation as in Townsend, but did not indicate
how it came to this conclusion. Since mistaken information will rarely be apparent from
the face of the record, how did the appellate court make its finding that there were no
errors? Did the defendant so admit? Did the appellate court make its own investigation?
Or was an evidentiary hearing on this issue held on the appellate level? See also United
States v. Dace, 502 F.2d 897, 900-01, 908 (8th Cir. 1974).
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States,417 where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the con-
victed defendant had a right to be apprised of:
at least such pivotal matters of public record as the convictions and
charges of crime, with date and place, attributed to him in the
[presentence] report.
The defendant should then be given an opportunity to refute
or explain any record disparagement of his earlier deportment.48
In Baker, the defendant pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery. The
trial court refused to disclose the probation officer's presentence report
to the defendant before sentencing. Although the defendant had
never been convicted of any crime, the court felt that prior charges
against him had been withdrawn because the defendant's father had
paid off the complaining parties. The judge then sentenced the
defendant to fourteen years imprisonment. Following his commitment,
the defendant wrote to the judge, asserting his innocence of any earlier
wrongdoing and denying that anyone had ever paid anything to save
him from criminal prosecution. Later, his attorney obtained partial
access to the part of the presentence report listing six criminal charges
against the defendant, including one which asserted that he had been
accused of cheating and swindling in Georgia in 1959 and that $27,000
had been advanced by members of his family over a period of five years
to avoid prosecution. The defendant filed affidavits in district court
denying these charges and moved to vacate sentence. The district
court refused on the grounds that the court was under no duty to dis-
close any portion of the report to the defendant and that the court had
only considered other criminal charges and not convictions against the
defendant. Under the compulsion of Townsend, the appellate court
reversed and remanded for resentencing. However, the appellate
court felt that neither Townsend nor Kent compelled complete dis-
closure of the presentence report, fearing that this would lead to the
loss of valuable information to the sentencing court:
No conviction or criminal charge should be included in the
report, or considered by the court, unless referable to an official
record. Of course, the defendant's general conduct and behavior,
as well as his reputation in the community in regard to honesty,
rectitude and fulfillment of his civic and domestic responsibilities,
may be treated in the report. Whether any of such commentary
should be released will remain in the discretion of the District
Judge. Names of informants, as well as intimate observations
readily traceable by the defendant, ordinarily should be withheld
lest, to repeat, disclosure cut off the investigator from access to
knowledge highly valuable to the sentencing court. It is to be
47. 388 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968).
48. Id. at 933.
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expected of the judge, however, that he winnow substance from
gossip.49
The appellate court did not delineate the procedure by which
the defendant could refute or explain derogatory information, nor did
the court comment on whether or not the defendant would enjoy the
right to confront witnesses furnishing the court with such information
or the right to produce witnesses in his own behalf. The defendant
still had no right to view the entire presentence report or to know or
rebut all adverse information being considered against him by the court.
Thus, while the defendant had a right to limited disclosure of matters
of public record, such as convictions and criminal charges being con-
sidered against him, the rights guaranteed him by due process in a hear-
ing to challenge that information remained unclear.
Judicial Reform
Disclosure
The first tentative step toward reform was taken by the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Weston.50 The defendant
had been convicted of receiving, concealing and facilitating the trans-
portation of illegally imported heroin. The trial judge initially indi-
cated that the minimum mandatory sentence of five years would be
appropriate, but acceded to the prosecutor's request that he consider a
presentence report alleging that the defendant was one of the largest
narcotics dealers in the area and travelled periodically to Mexico. These
allegations were based upon a statement to the probation officer by nar-
cotics agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
The defendant, when informed by the court of these serious allegations
at the sentencing hearing, vehemently denied such allegations and pro-
claimed her innocence. The court gave the defense an opportunity to
rebut these allegations with factual information, thus placing on the de-
fendant the burden of disproving the allegations of the presentence
report. The trial court indicated that if the defendant could not dis-
prove these allegations, it would treat them as true and consider them
against her when determining her sentence. The defendant's counsel
declined to attempt to rebut the allegations, asserting that they were
without factual basis and that he could not conceive of what kind of
investigation he could make to disprove a statement by an undisclosed
informant that his client was a large-scale heroin dealer. The trial court
on its own motion directed the prosecutor to submit factual material
to support the conclusion set forth in the presentence report in an in
camera hearing. The defendant and her counsel were excluded from
49. Id. at 934.
50. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972).
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the hearing in which the prosecutor submitted the confidential report.
The trial judge held that the conclusions of the presentence report were
substantiated and then imposed the maximum permissible sentence of
twenty years.51
Upon appeal, the confidential report was forwarded under seal to
the appellate court. It consisted solely of an unsworn memorandum
from a federal agent to his superior. In the memorandum the agent
merely quoted a named informant to the effect that the defendant was
about to make a trip to Mexico and was distributing quantities of heroin
to another individual for delivery to customers. No further concrete
information was given in the confidential report to corroborate the
broad charges of the presentence report, nor did the agent's memoran-
dum contain anything to show that the informant was reliable. The
appellate court was aghast that the defendant had been sentenced on
the basis of such inherently unreliable information. The palpable unfair-
ness of such a sentencing procedure was exceedingly clear to the court:
In essence, then, what we have is a conviction at a trial pro-
viding all of the safeguards required by the Constitution, of an
offense warranting, in the opinion of the trial judge, the minimum
sentence of five years. This is followed by a determination, based
on unsworn evidence detailing otherwise unverified statements of
a faceless informer that would not even support a search warrant
or an arrest, and without any of the constitutional safeguards, that
[the defendant] is probably guilty of additional and far more
serious crimes, for which she is then given an additional sentence
of fifteen years. . . . To us, there is something radically wrong
with a system of justice that can produce such a result.62
After further reviewing the shortcomings of the confidential
report, the appellate court concluded:
This will not do. It is tantamount to saying that once a
defendant has been convicted of offense A, narcotics agents can
say to the probation officer, and the probation officer can say to
the judge, "We think that she is guilty of much more serious offense
B, although all we have to go on is an informer's report," and thejudge can then say to the defendant, "You say it isn't so; prove
that to me!" In addition to the difficulty of "proving a negative,"
we think it a great miscarriage of justice to expect [the defendant]
or her attorney to assume the burden and expense of proving to the
court that she is not the large scale dealer that the anonymous in-
formant says -that she is.
In Townsend v. Burke. . . the Supreme Court made it clear
that a sentence cannot be predicated on false information. We
extend it but little in holding that a sentence cannot be predicated
on information of so little value as that here involved. A rational
51. Id. at 627-30.
52. Id. at 630-31 (citations omitted).
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penal system must have some concern for the probable .accuracy of
the informational inputs in the sentencing process.5 3
Thus, Weston appears to have been founded upon the proposition
that the imposition of sentence on the basis of such potentially inac-
curate information was an abuse of due process.5 4 However, Weston
did not decide whether a convicted defendant had a right to disclosure
of information contained in the presentence report, since the trial court
had exercised its discretion under Rule 32 and voluntarily disclosed to
the defendant the substance of the allegations made in the presentence
report.
The next step in the direction of full disclosure was taken by the
First Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Picard,55 where, al-
though the defendant's attorney was allowed to see the presentence
report, the trial judge did not permit him to disclose its contents or dis-
cuss it in any way with his client. The trial court acknowledged that
the report contained hearsay statements and that it did not consider all
of the report as true. Nevertheless, in order to protect some of the
report's sources of information and avoid prolonging the sentencing pro-
ceeding, the court imposed sentence upon the defendant without giving
him an opportunity to inspect the report or rebut any adverse informa-
tion in it. Relying upon Townsend, Tucker and Weston, the appel-
late court reversed, holding that subject to certain limitations, "the
substance of a presentence report, to the extent it is relied upon, should
be made known to the defendant.!" The court continued:
On resentencing, the court should either identify for the record and
disavow information not relied upon or disclose to the defendant
and his counsel as much of the report as is consistent with its
desire to protect either the defendant (e.g., diagnostic information
may be withheld to the extent that its disclosure might impede
rehabilitative efforts) or others. One method of accomplishing this
sensitive task would be for the court to excerpt from the report any
possibly prejudicial diagnostic evaluations and any statements
which may expose a vulnerable source to identification by the
defendant. Any material so excerpted should then be summarized
orally in open court, insofar as this can be accomplished in a man-
ner which removes the possibility of prejudice to rehabilitative
efforts or of identification of vulnerable sources. 57
Thus, subject to necessary limitations to protect sources of information
and rehabilitative efforts, under Picard the defendant has the due
53. Id. at 634.
54. See Note, Criminal Procedure-Probable Cause and Due Process at Sentencing,
50 N.C.L REv. 925, 932-33 (1972); Note, Criminal Law-Presentence Reports-Alle-
gations of Prior Criminal Activity-Factual Determination-Degree and Burden of
Proof, 33 OHio ST. L.J. 960, 961 (1972).
55. 464 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1972).
56. Id. at 220.
57. Id. at 220-21.
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process right to inspect the presentence report or to be apprised in
open court of the substance of any material excerpted from it. How-
ever, the court did not indicate how the defendant could challenge the
report or any adverse information in it which the defendant felt to be
false or inaccurate.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to go quite that far
in Johnson v. United States5s and United States v. Green59 and did not
recognize the right of a defendant to view the presentence report. In
Johnson, the defendant pleaded guilty to falsely endorsing four United
States Treasury checks. Subsequently, a presentence investigation was
conducted, a report was furnished and the defendant was sentenced to
concurrent terms of imprisonment for four years. In Green, the de-
fendant was convicted of violating the Dyer Act, and sentenced pur-
suant to the Indeterminate Sentencing Act ° to a maximum of four
years. In both Johnson and Green, the defendants challenged the
validity of their sentences on the ground that they had not been allowed
to see their presentence reports. While holding that Tucker did not
require that the defendant have access to the presentence report, the
appellate court in each case did recognize that the trial court was re-
quired to disclose to the defendant that information in the report which
the court is taking into consideration in pronouncing sentence. 1 Thus
in Johnson there was no error where the trial court communicated to
the defendant the information contained in the presentence report . 2
In Green, the appellate court was unable to perceive any abuse of dis-
cretion in the trial court's refusal to furnish the defendant personally
with a copy of the presentence report where the report had been sub-
mitted to the defendant's attorney prior to sentencing.63 In neither
Johnson nor Green did the appellate court discuss what procedure would
be applicable if a defendant wished to challenge any information upon
which his sentence was based. The Green court's rationale was that non-
disclosure of the presentence report protects the flow of facts concern-
ing the defendant, which by encouraging a broad scope of knowledge
insures intelligent and effective sentencing. 4
This approach was followed by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Gorden"5 and United States v. Miller."6
58. 485 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1973).
59. 483 F.2d 469 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1071 (1973).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1970).
61. Johnson v. United States, 485 F.2d at 242; United States v. Green, 483 F.2d at
470, 471.
62. 485 P.2d at 242.
63. 483 F.2d at 470.
64. Id.
65. 495 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974).
66. 495 F2d 362 (7th Cir. 1974).
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In Gorden no abuse of discretion was found where the trial court dis-
closed the general nature of the matters in the presentence report on
which it relied in fixing sentence and afforded the defendant an "ade-
quate opportunity" to rebut the factors which determined his sen-
tence.67  In Miller the trial court refused to reveal any portion of the
presentence report other than the defendant's prior record. In revers-
ing and remanding for resentencing, the appellate court held that while
the presentence report need not be made available to counsel or made
a part of the record, fairness to the defendant requires that the trial
court disclose any grounds in the presentence report motivating its im-
position of sentence. The court further elaborated:
mff fhe judge regards any information in the presentence report
as sufficiently important to affect the sentence, the substance of
that information should be disclosed to the defendant or his counsel
before sentence is pronounced. If the trial judge denies a motion
seeking access to a presentence report, he should henceforth make
it clear that his sentence determination is not predicated on the
contents of the report or describe the substance of any matter he
considers significant. This will avoid the kind of error exemplified
by Townsend v. Burke. 68
The court also gave some indication of what constitutes an adequate
opportunity to rebut derogatory information contained in the presen-
tence report:
Although the district judge in these cases feared that disclosure
would lead to lengthy trial-type proceedings at the sentencing stage,
this opinion does not modify his power to limit the evidence taken
on collateral issues. In its notes to its 1970 draft of proposed rule
amendments, the Advisory Committee reported: "Experience injurisdictions which require disclosure does not lend support to the
argument that disclosure will result in less complete presentence
reports or the argument that sentencing procedures will become
unnecessarily protracted." 69
Thus a defendant challenging the informational basis of his sentence
seems to have a right to submit evidence upon that issue, though the
precise parameters of rebuttal remain unclear as does the defendant's
right to cross-examine those witnesses who have supplied the court with
adverse information.
The Opportunity to Rebut
In a series of recent cases, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
come to the view that fundamental fairness requires that the defendant
have the right to be apprised of the nature of the information relied
67. 495 F.2d at 310.
68. 495 F.2d at 364-65 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 365.
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upon by the trial court in assessing sentence and a right to rebut such
information. In United States v. Battaglia,71 the trial judge explicitly
informed the defendant that he was relying upon certain facts in impos-
ing sentence. In a petition to modify sentence the defendant contended
that these facts were untrue. In considering the motion, the judge
said that he would have imposed the same sentence if the facts were
untrue. The appellate court reversed, commenting:
Although this may be so, we think it is better to assure the defend-
ant that the alleged untrue facts will not affect his sentence by per-
mitting him a hearing at which he may seek to remove any linger-
ing doubt the court may have had about the true situation. The
court should then reconsider the sentence in the light of the true
facts as found after hearing.71
Next, in United States v. Espinoza,72 the trial court in sentencing
explicitly relied upon the fact that the defendant had a history of mak-
ing threats and assaults even though he had never actually been con-
victed. After sentence had been pronounced, the defendant filed a peti-
tion for reduction of sentence in which he requested an opportunity to
present evidence to rebut the history of making threats and assaults
upon which the court relied. The trial court denied the defendant's
request without explanation. Relying upon the due process arguments
of Townsend, Tucker and Weston, the appellate court held that where
a sentencing. judge explicitly relies on certain information in assessing
a sentence, fundamental fairness requires that a defendant be given at
least some opportunity to rebut that information.73 The appellate
court indicated that the extent of a defendant's right to rebut was
subject to the discretion of the sentencing court.74 It must be noted
that the appellate court did not consider the issue of disclosure
of the presentence report, and at the time of the Espinoza decision
the Fifth Circuit rule was that disclosure was within the discretion
of the trial court. 75 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals resolved
this apparent inconsistency in favor of disclosure in Shelton v. United
States.76 Reasoning that since the defendant has the initial burden of
showing that the court relied upon misinformation, the court held that
the defendant must be advised of the nature of the information in order
to have the rebuttal opportunity granted by Espinoza.77
70. 478 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1972).
71. Id. at 854.
72. 481 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 555-58.
74. Id. at 557.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Lloyd, 425 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1970). In Espinoza the appellate court itself
pointed out this anomaly. 481 F.2d at 555, 558.
76. 497 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1974).
77. Id. at 160.
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Similarly relying upon Townsend, Tucker and Weston, both the
Fourth and the Sixth Circuits have also concluded that due process
requires a defendant be afforded the opportunity to rebut derogatory
information relied upon by the sentencing judge. In United States v.
Powell,7s the defendant, along with his two brothers, had been con-
victed in separate trials of receiving and concealing stolen motor ve-
hicles which moved in interstate commerce. At the sentencing hear-
ing, the defendant's attorney informed the court that he believed that
the presentence report contained information from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation that the defendant was the mastermind of an auto theft
ring, and that such prejudicial information was not supported by any
facts. The district court judge denied the defendant's request to see
the presentence report. Immediately before sentencing, the judge indi-
cated there was no doubt in his mind that the defendant was the ring-
leader. The judge stated that he was basing this judgment on what
he had heard at trial and disclaimed reliance upon the presentence re-
port. Without further delay he sentenced the defendant to prison terms
twice as long as that imposed on another brother who had been con-
victed of more counts -than the defendant. Upon appeal, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals failed to find any evidence in the record of
the defendant's trial, or in the trials of the defendant's mother or brother,
establishing that the defendant was the ring leader. Relying upon the
due process rule of Townsend, the appellate court found a denial of due
process in the trial court's imposition of sentence without reopening the
proceedings to allow the defendant an opportunity to explain or deny
these charges.
In Collins v. Buchkoe79 the defendant was convicted of rape in
a nonjury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment. In imposing sen-
tence the district court judge relied upon information in the presentence
report that the defendant had raped another victim. The defendant
was not afforded an opportunity to confront or cross-examine the
alleged victim who had furnished this extremely damaging information
to the probation officer. Grounding its decision on the conceptions of
due process expounded in Townsend, Tucker and Weston, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that due process limitations require
the defendant be given an opportunity to rebut sentencing information
and remanded the case to the district court for a resolution of the truth
or falsity of the presentence report accusations.
To date, the most extensive judicial discussion of the nature of the
rebuttal procedure has been by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
78. 487 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1973). Cf. United States v. Looney, 501 F.2d 1039 (4th
Cir. 1974).
79. 493 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1974).
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in United States v. Rosner.80 In Rosner, the trial court possessed a
sixteen page closely typed memorandum from the United States At-
torney's office accusing the defendant of "possible misrepresentations,
fraudulent conduct, lying and unethical behavior, '81 for over two
months. However, the court did not disclose this memorandum to de-
fendant's counsel until the morning of actual sentencing. The court
denied defense counsel's request for an adjournment despite the fact
that counsel did not have ahy time to review or even absorb the many
new charges against the defendant. Finding that defense counsel was
not given an adequate opportunity to correct any possible misinforma-
tion in the prosecutor's memorandum, the appellate court vacated the
sentence and remanded for resentencing. The appellate court ordered:
In resentencing, the judge redrawn will either not consider the
prosecutor's report, or if he deems it desirable to read it, will afford
a reasonable opportunity, in advance of sentencing, to defense
counsel to attempt to refute its accusations. We do not, however,
order an evidentiary hearing.82
The Rosner court felt that the defendant should have been afforded
. . 'an opportunity to answer or explain' .. by means short of an
evidentiary hearing but not in 'a niggardly fashion.' "8" Thus while
Rosner holds that a defendant must have a reasonable opportunity to
refute, including adequate time in advance of sentencing to prepare,
the exact nature of the rebuttal hearing and the type and extent of evi-
dence to be introduced is left to the discretion of the trial court. Also
left unclear is whether or not the defendant will enjoy the right to con-
front and cross-examine those who have supplied the court with adverse
information. This approach is unsatisfactory, because if there are issues
of fact which critically affect the disposition of the defendant's life,
fairness to him dictates that these issues be decided by the traditional
means thought necessary to attain accuracy. 4
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Act of 1975
On April 22, 1974, under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. sections
3771 and 3772, the chief justice of the United States Supreme Court
submitted to Congress a series of proposed amendments to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 5 As proposed by the Supreme Court,
Rule 32(c) (3) would have provided:
80. 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974).
81. Id. at 1229.
82. Id. at 1231.
83. Id. at 1230 (citations omitted).
84. Cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
85. For a discussion of the merits of the version of Rule 32 proposed by the United
States Supreme Court regarding disclosure, see Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports
in Federal Court: Due Process and Judicial Discretion, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1527 (1975).
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(3) Disclosure.
(A) Before imposing sentence, the court shall upon request per-
mit the defendant, or his counsel if he is so represented, to read
the report of the presentence investigation exclusive of any recom-
mendation as to sentence unless in the opinion of the court the
report contains diagnostic opinion which might seriously disrupt a
program of rehabilitation, sources of information obtained upon a
promise of confidentiality, or any other information which, if dis-
closed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to the defend-
ant or other persons; and the court shall afford the defendant or
his counsel an opportunity to comment thereon.
(B) If the court is of the view that there is information in the
presentence report which should not be disclosed under subdivision(c)(3)(A) of this rule, the court in lieu of making the report or
part thereof available shall state orally or in writing a summary of
the factual information contained therein to be relied on in deter-
mining sentence, and shall give the defendant or his counsel an
opportunity to comment thereon.86
After the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were submitted, Congress delayed their implementation un-
til August 1, 1975.87 The apparent reason for the delay was to give
Congress time to evaluate these controversial proposals. 8 At the hear-
ings on the proposed amended rules, the proponents of disclosure in-
cluded judges, law professors and public defenders, speaking on behalf
of such prestigious organizations as the Judicial Conference of the
United States, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Law
and Social Policy, the American Bar Association, the National Council
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and -the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association." However, strong opposition to mandatory disclosure was
expressed by prosecutors and trial judges.90
On the critical question of rebuttal of information contained in
the presentence investigation report, the judges representing the Judicial
Conference of the United States favored leaving the procedure to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge. 1 Some congressmen feared that a mandatory
86. Proposed Amendments, supra note 8, at 320-21.
87. PuB. L No. 93-361, 88 Stat. 397 (1974). The proposed amended rules would
have gone into effect on August 1, 1974.
88. See S. REP. No. 1023, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-6 (1974); H. REP. No. 1144,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1974).
89. See generally Hearings on Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 61 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings]; Hearings on Pro-
posed Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6
(1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
90. 1974 Hearings, supra note 89, at 138-39; 1975 Hearings, supra note 89, at
244, 260, 288, 294.
91. 1975 Hearings, supra note 89, at 204-05, 216-17, 219.
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evidentiary hearing at sentencing would lead to delay and obstruction
of the administration of justice.92 Professor Leon Friedman, speaking
for the American Civil Liberties Union, argued in favor of a mandatory
evidentiary hearing for factual disputes relating to the presentence re-
port.93 However, he abandoned this position and urged leaving the
submission of evidence to the trial judge's discretion,9 4 and later even
submitted a written proposal to that effect.95
As a result of this judicial, congressional and academic opposition
to mandatory evidentiary hearings, Congress enacted the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975. Rule 32(c) (3) (A)
of the Act provides that upon disclosure of the presentence report:
the court shall afford the defendant or his counsel an opportunity
to comment thereon and, at the discretion of the court, to introduce
testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual
inaccuracy contained in the presentence report.96
However, proposed Rule 32(c)(3)(B) was not amended by Congress,
and became law as originally submitted by the Supreme Court. As a
result when the trial court summarizes the factual information con-
tained in the presentence report, rather than disclosing it, there is no
provision, discretionary or otherwise, for the submission of evidence on
controverted facts in the presentence report.9"
Amended Rule 32 would go far in extending to convicted defend-
ants the right to disclosure of the informational basis for their sentence.
Before imposing sentence, the trial court must permit the defendant
or his counsel to read the presentence report, or, if any information is
excerpted, the trial court must summarize orally or in writing the fac-
tual information contained in the report upon which the court relies in
determining sentence. Thus, amended Rule 32 closely follows the
liberal disclosure rule first announced by the First Circuit in Picard,8
preserving the same safeguards against disclosure of informational
sources and diagnostic portions of the presentence report, rather than
adopting the seemingly more restrictive approach of the Seventh Cir-
92. Id. at 27, 173, 175.
93. Id. at 3-4, 15-16.
94. Id. at 16.
95. Id. at 31. Professor Friedman proposed the following amendment: Rule 32(c)
(3)(A): Add at the end of the paragraph: . . . or, at the reasonable discretion of the
court, to introduce testimony or evidence relating to any alleged factual inaccuracy con-
tained in the presentence report. There is a striking similarity between Professor Fried-
man's proposal and the final form in which Rule 32(c)(2)(A) was finally adopted by
Congress. See note 96 infra.
96. PUB. L. No. 94-64, § 3(33), 89 Stat. 370 (1975).
97. See note 86 supra and text accompanying.
98, 464 F.2d at 220-21,
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cuit in Gorden,9 which only required the disclosure of the general na-
ture, of matters in the presentence report.
Inadequacies of Amended Rule 32
While amended Rule 32(c) (3) (A) would permit the defendant to
discover the factual basis of his sentence in most instances, it does not
provide for disclosure sufficiently in advance of sentencing to afford
defense counsel adequate time to prepare for the sentencing hearing.
More importantly, it fails to establish for the defendant any means to
ensure the accuracy of sentencing information, leaving the introduc-
tion of testimony or other information on controverted factual issues to
the discretion of the court. Rule 32 does not delineate the procedure
to be used when the defendant challenges a fact in the presentence
report, nor does it allow a defendant the right to present witnesses in
his own behalf or confront and cross-examine those who have furnished
the court with adverse information in the presentence report.100  In
addition, where Rule 32(c)(3)(B) provides for a factual summary
when information in the presentence report is withheld, there is no
provision for even discretionary submission of evidence by the defendant.
The Need for an Adversary Hearing
It is precisely at a presentence hearing which would determine the
existence or nonexistence of a controverted fact in the presentence report
that a protracted hearing should be held.10 Since the fact in issue will be
used by the trial judge in determining sentence, it is unfair to decide
such an important factual issue in anything less than a full evidentiary
hearing with the formal submission of evidence subject to the normal
rules of evidence and the rights of the defendant to subpoena and pre-
sent witnesses and confront those who have asserted the fact in issue.
Surely the determination of sentence is as crucial to a criminal defendant
as is the determination of his guilt or innocence. Due process requires
that a defendant enjoy a full and fair opportunity to ensure the factual
accuracy of the information used to determine his sentence by extending
to the defendant those same traditional means used to resolve factual
issues. As Professor Richard Lehrich has pointed out:
99. 495 F.2d at 310.
100. The Advisory Committee, which proposed amended Rule 32 to the United
States Supreme Court, felt that sentencing procedures, despite their function of providing
accurate sentencing information, could be conducted informally without subjecting the
probation officer to any rigorous examination by defense counsel or even placing him
under oath. See Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Amendments, supra note 8, at
325.
101. A.B.A. STANDA s, supra note 6, at 254.
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Basic fairness to the accused would seem to require the same
opportunity to rebut evidence against him at sentencing as at trial.
The stakes at sentencing may be just as high, and the justification
for nondisclosure no more, than at the time of guilt determination.
Why should the right of confrontation, so "zealously" protected by
the Supreme Court in recent years, not be applied to the sentencing
process?' 0 2
In deference to the demands of fundamental fairness, both the
Model Sentencing Act'0 3 and the American Bar Association Stand-
ards' 04 propose a presentencing hearing to determine any factual issues
raised by the presentence report where the defendant enjoys the rights
of confrontation and cross-examination. In addition, a majority of
American states by legislative enactment or judicial decision now pro-
vide for mandatory disclosure of the presentence investigation report
or its informational contents, with protection for confidential sources or
diagnostic portions of the report. 0 5 This is a strong indication of the
critical nature of this information in determining sentence. It is only
fair to the defendant that such information be accurately established.
In other similar fact-determining proceedings, the Supreme Court
has held that due process requires that the defendant be afforded the
right to present witnesses and documentary evidence and the right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses. In two recent cases,
Morrissey v. Brewer'0 6 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli,10 7 the Court found that
102. Lehrich, supra note 2, at 251-52.
103. MODEL SENTENCING ACr, supra note 10, § 10.
104. A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 5.4
105. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.075 (Cum. Supp. 1974); ARiz. R. CusM. P. 26.6 (1973);
State v. Pierce, 108 Ariz. 174, 494 P.2d 696 (1972); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203, 1203.03
(West Cum. Supp. 1974); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-102 (Cum. Supp. 1973),
COLO. R. CRtim. P. 32(a)(2) (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-109a (Cune. Supp.
1975); FLA. R. CRim. P. 3.713 (Cum. Supp. 1974); State v. Rolfe, 97 Idaho 467, 444
P.2d 428 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-4 (Smith-Hurd 1973); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 35-8-IA-13 (Bums 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4605 (1974); MAINE R. CIM.
P. 32(c)(2) (1974 Supp.); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 124(b) (Cum. Supp. 1974),
Haynes v. State, 19 Md. App. 428, 311 A.2d 822 (1973); People v. McFarlin, 389 Mich.
557, 208 N.W.2d 504 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.115 (1964), MINN. R. CriM. P.
27.02 (1975); Kuhl v. District Court, 139 Mont. 536, 366 P.2d 347 (1961); Nav. REv.
STAT. § 176.156 (1973); NJ.R. CraM. P. 3:21-2, 3:21-3 (1972), State v. Kunz, 55 N.J.
128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969); State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 126 S.E.2d 126 (1962) N.D.R.
CIM. P. 32(c)(3) (1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 982 (Cum. Supp. 1974); ORE.
REv. STAT. § 137.079 (1973); PA. R. CRIM. P. 1404 (1975), Commonwealth v. Phelps,
450 Pa. 597, 301 A.2d 678 (1973); VT. R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(3) (1974); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.2-229, 53-278.1 (Supp. 1975), Linton v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 437, 65 S.E.2d
534 (1951); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIM. R. 7.2(c) (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
972.15 (1971); Wo. R. CIuM. P. 32(c)(2) (Supp. 1975).
106. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Note, however, the right to confrontation and cross-
examination in parole and probation revocation hearings is subject to limitation if the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation. Id. at 489.
107. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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due process compelled the recognition of these rights in parole and pro-
bation revocation proceedings. The rationale behind Morrissey and
Gagnon was that even though parole or probation revocation were not
parts of a criminal prosecution, the loss of liberty entailed was a serious
deprivation requiring that the defendant be accorded due process
protections.
Surely the criminal defendant at sentencing faces the same, if not
more serious, potential deprivation of liberty. To ensure the accuracy
of sentencing information the convicted defendant must be afforded an
adequate opportunity to challenge the facts upon which his sentence
is predicated. This can only be accomplished by extending to him the
right to present witnesses and documentary evidence in his own behalf
and the right of confrontation and cross-examination. The Court has
repeatedly recognized that these rights are essential to any fair fact-
finding determination which affords the defendant due process of law.
Conclusion
Amended Rule 32 is a laudable step in the direction of providing
due process at sentencing. Congress should extend its reform of Rule 32
to clearly define the procedure for resolving any factual determina-
tions made necessary by controverted presentence report allegations.
Congress should recognize the convicted defendant's due process right,
not only to disclosure of the factual information upon which his sen-
tence is based, but also to a full and fair opportunity to challenge any
information in the presentence report which he feels to be inaccurate.
The defendant's exercise of his right to present witnesses and his right
to confrontation and cross-examination is a prerequisite to accurate
information necessary to a proper determination of sentence.
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